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TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS
Introduction to the Study of Law, as its name indicates,
is the first-year course which introduces Latin American
law students to the law, and establishes the conceptual
framework not only for their years as students, but for their
careers as lawyers. More than any other single course, it
defines the terms and sets the tone for the study and the
practice of law. For this very reason, Introduction to the
Study of Law is also valuable to United States students of
Latin American legal systems, as it enables them to see the
law and the legal process as their Latin American counter-
parts see it.
The translation which follows is of major portions of six
chapters of the thirty-third edition of the text most widely
used in Mexico for courses in Introduction to the Study of
Law: Eduardo Garcia Maynez's Introducci6n al estudio del
derecho. The chapters selected (chapters 22-24 and 27-29)
are from the Fourth Part of the book, the part titled, The
Juridical Technique, that is, the application of law to par-
ticular cases. These chapters ought to be of significance to
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students of comparative law and to common-law lawyers
with international practices because they deal with that
area where the law makes its transition from theory to
practice, and where differences between the Common Law
and the Civil Law are most palpable. These chapters are
devoted, respectively, to The Application of Law, The Con-
cept of Interpretation, The Exegetic Method, Statutes and
Judicial Decisions, Processes of Integration and Rules of In-
terpretation in Mexican Law. In order to put these chapters
in context, a listing of the parts and chapters of Introduc-
ci6n al estudio del derecho is included as an Appendix.
Dr. Garcia Mdynez, like all other serious legal scholars,
disagrees at times with the positions of other jurists, and he
often identifies such disagreements in the text. The pur-
pose of the present rendering, however, is not to highlight
those controversies, much less to attempt to evaluate them.
The materials which follow were selected for translation
because of their representativeness and influence, as
proved by their widespread use for more than fifty years in
a major Latin American country, and their consequent role
in shaping the outlook of tens of thousands of lawyers.
Robert S. Barker
XXI. THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW
161. The Juridical Technique
[T]he Juridical Technique has as its object the study of
the problems related to the application of objective law to
concrete cases.
We will begin by referring, generally, to the notion of
technique.
The word comes from the Greek.. .and signifies art.
The arts, not only the manual and industrial, but also the
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disinterested, or fine, always possess a specific technique,
which consists in the employment of means for the
achievement of the ends that constitute its essence. There
exist not only the techniques of the smithy and the cabi-
netmaker, but also of the musician and the architect, be-
cause the latter, like the former, must avail themselves of
suitable procedures for the attainment of the ends that they
pursue. That which we call technique (lato sensu) is pre-
cisely the application of suitable means for the achievement
of artistic purposes. But as the suitableness to which we
refer supposes understanding of the efficacy of the proce-
dures employed, and that understanding is of a scientific
order, every genuine technique must be illuminated by the
light of science.
Even the most rudimentary technique imaginable nec-
essarily involves a minimum amount of knowledge and, in
this sense, is of a scientific kind. An unscientific technique
is not a technique at all, because it is incapable of fulfilling
its purpose or, what is the same thing, because it does not
permit the attainment of the ends to which it is dedicated.
We saw [earlier] how the rules of the arts are judg-
ments that express a conditional necessity in that they
point out the roads that must be followed in the hypothesis
that seeks to arrive at a given goal.
If we apply this notion to the special case of law, we
can say that the juridical technique consists in the appro-
priate handling of the means that permit the attainment of
the ends that are being pursued. But as these ends are ob-
tained through the formulation and application of norms,
we must distinguish the technique of formulation from that
of the application of legal precepts. The first, which has
come to be called the legislative technique, is the art of the
elaboration or formulation of statutes; the second concerns
the application of objective law to individual cases. Thus,
the handling of the legislative technique refers, essentially,
to the realization of general juridical ends; the handling of
the technique of application is directed, on the other hand,
to the realization of concrete juridical ends.
1998]
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We have said that juridical precepts consist of two ele-
ments, the factual hypothesis and the disposition.1 The first
is that which, on occurring, gives rise to the normative con-
sequence that the disposition indicate: The disposition indi-
cates the duties and rights that the occurrence of the hy-
pothesis generates.
The hypothesis is the enunciation of a possibility that,
upon being converted into reality, causes legal conse-
quences. The creation of these consequences depends upon
the occurrence of the fact that the hypothesis foresees. Be-
cause of this it is important to distinguish the notions of ju-
ridical hypothesis and juridical fact.2
When there are produced the conditions that make up
the hypothesis, ipso facto, there arise specified normative
consequences, namely: duties and rights.
The consequences of which we speak are necessarily at-
tributed to specified subjects, because mere things cannot
have rights or assume obligations. The realization of the
juridical hypotheses determines, always and necessarily, a
change in the legal world, because it implies the creation,
or the transmission, or the modification or the extinction of
rights and obligations. In this sense, to apply a norm is to
formulate a judgment of attribution in relation to the sub-
jects who, in consequence of the realization of the hypothe-
sis, acquire obligations or rights.
162. Determination of the Subjects
[If, for example, Juan and Pedro have entered into a
bilateral contract, it is evident that the juridical conse-
quences of the transaction will necessarily rest upon Pedro
and Juan. But.. .the attribution of rights and obligations is
not always so simple. Recall the rule of Roman law ac-
cording to which, if a tile is thrown from a house and,. fal-
1. Footnote omitted by translator.
2. Footnote omitted by translator.
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ling, kills a passerby, the owner of the building is obligated
to indemnify the [victim's] relatives.3 The disposition in the
case is very clear: There is no doubt that the person obli-
gated by the realization of the hypothesis is the owner of
the house. But the application of this precept to a concrete
case requires the individualization or determination of the
obligor, and this requires, in turn, the examination of an-
other juridical fact, concerning the ownership of the real
property. This juridical fact can be the making of a con-
tract of purchase and sale, or a gift, etc.
The example reveals that the application of a juridical
precept to a concrete case does not involve merely proving
that the hypothetical situation has in fact occurred, thus
producing certain juridical results; rather, it requires, in
addition, the attribution of the normative consequences to
determined, or at least determinable, subjects.
In the act of application, we can distinguish two dis-
tinct steps:
1. The proof that an act brings about the realization of
the hypothesis of a legal norm; and
2. The attribution or imputation of the consequences of
that norm to determined persons.
163. The Juridical Syllogism
The reasoning involved in the application of the rules
of law is syllogistic. The major premise is the [juridical]
norm; the minor premise is the judgment that declares that
the hypothesis has been realized; and, the conclusion is the
application of the legal consequences to the subjects in-
volved. Let us look at two examples:
[First Example:]
Major premise: One who commits the crime of counter-
feiting shall be sentenced to between six months and five
3. Citation omitted by translator.
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years of imprisonment, and a fine of between one hundred
and three thousand pesos, Criminal Code of the Federal
District, art. 234.
Minor premise: X has committed the crime of counter-
feiting.
Conclusion: X shall be sentenced to a term of impris-
onment of between six months and five years and fined be-
tween one hundred and three thousand pesos.
Second example:
Major premise: He who sows, plants, or builds on his
own land, with seeds, plants, or materials of another, ac-
quires ownership of the same, but has the obligation to pay
for them and, if he has acted in bad faith he must pay dam-
ages [dans y perjuicios], Civil Code of the Federal District,
art. 897.
Minor premise: Z has sown his farm with seeds be-
longing to Y, but not in bad faith;
Conclusion: Z is obligated to pay to Y the value of the
seeds, but Y may not require indemnification for Y's losses.
We have intentionally chosen the example of article
234 of the current Criminal Code in order to demonstrate
that the process of application is not always reducible to a
single syllogism. The syllogistic application of the norm
contained in the article leads to the conclusion that the
counterfeiter should be sentenced to prison for a period of
between six months and five years, and be made to pay a
fine of between one hundred and three thousand pesos; but
that does not entirely resolve the concrete case of X, be-
cause the statute obligates the judge to fix the punishment
within certain limits, according to particular factual cir-
cumstances, as enumerated in article 52 of the same Code
(footnote omitted). The judgment of sentence entered
against X cannot, therefore, be based simply on article 234;
rather, it must also be based on other provisions of the




164. Private and Official Application of
Juridical Norms
The application of the law to concrete cases can be pri-
vate or public. In the first situation, its object is simply
knowledge; in the second (i.e., application, properly speak-
ing), it is the official determination of the consequences that
are derived from a normative hypothesis, for the purpose of
carrying out the consequences.
[Iun both situations, the process of application is the
same. The difference is not in the method employed.. .but
in the effect to be given to those two types of application.
Even when, scientifically and technically, the private or
doctrinal application is correct, only the official one binds
the parties. This is what is meant by saying that res judi-
cata is the legal truth. In the face of the legal truth (that is,
the official definitive application of the law to a concrete
case), the doctrinal application has only the value of a non-
binding opinion, which may be correct or incorrect. We use
the term definitive (emphasis added) official application be-
cause, as is well known, there are many occasions in which
the first official application can be modified by higher
authority (as by appeal, revision, etc.). Only when use is
not made of opportunities for review within the prescribed
time, or when the question is resolved in the last instance,
does the official application have a non-modifiable charac-
ter.
165. Problems Related to the Process of
Application
The fundamental questions that can arise in the appli-
cation of objective law to concrete cases involve...the fol-
lowing:






5. Territorial conflicts of law
[We have already spoken], in our discussion of the leg-
islative process, of the way in which a statute comes to have
effect, and [we have discussed in another chapter] the rules
by which a statute may cease to have effect.... We there-
fore commend those discussions to our reader, as we now
turn to a consideration of the four other problems.
XXIII. THE CONCEPT OF INTERPRETATION
168. The Interpretation of Statutes, the
Concept
If we apply the foregoing ideas [about interpretation in
general] to the special case of the interpretation of statutes,
we will be able to say that to interpret a statute is to dis-
cover the meaning that it contains.
169. The Meaning of the Statute
The first problem with the theory of interpretation is
knowing what is meant by the meaning of the statute (em-
phasis added).
One of the solutions proposed is the assertion that the
meaning of the statute can be nothing other than the will of
the legislator. The defenders of this position argue as fol-
lows: The statute is the work of the legislative branch; the
legislature makes use of the statute in order to establish
law; consequently, the meaning of the statute should be
that meaning that the legislator wanted to state, since the
statute is the legislator's statement.
4. Citation omitted by translator.
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This thesis is based on the hypothesis that legislation,
as an expressive act, should be attributed to the will of the
legislators, or, what is the same thing: Law is what the leg-
islator wishes. This thesis does not take into account the
fact that the wish of the legislator does not always coincide
with that which is expressed in the statute.
What needs to be interpreted is not the will of the leg-
islator, but rather the text of the statute. This does not
mean that the interpretation must be purely grammatical,
because the significance of the words that the legislator
uses is not exhausted by its linguistic meaning. Many
words have equivocal meanings and many terms have a
precise juridical meaning used throughout the same legal
system.
Against the first type of interpretation, which Rad-
bruch calls philological-historical, there exists the logical-
systematic, which does not seek to discover the (purely
subjective) intention of the legislator, but rather seeks the
logical objective meaning of the statute, as an expression of
the law. According to this second approach, legal texts
have a meaning of their own, implicit in the signs of which
they are composed, and independent of the actual or pre-
sumed will of their authors.5 That meaning depends not
only on the words in which the statute is expressed, but
also in the systematic connections that necessarily exist be-
tween the meaning of a text and the meaning of other texts
that are part of the same body of law. The statute is thus
not considered as an expression of a wish (a fortiori subjec-
tive), but rather as a formulation of objective law.
Between these two antithetical positions there exists
an enormous range of intermediate doctrines, that empha-
size one or the other of the extreme positions. We will dis-
cuss some of them later.
5. Citation omitted by translator.
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170. Authors of Interpretation
Interpretation is not exclusively the work of the judge.
Any person who inquires into the meaning of a legal dispo-
sition can engage in interpretation. But the capacity in
which one interprets is not a matter of indifference, at least
from a practical point of view, because not all interpretation
is binding. Thus, for example, if the legislator, by means of
a statute, establishes in what way a legal precept is to be
understood, the legislative exegesis binds the whole world,
precisely because its author, by means of a secondary, in-
terpretative norm, has so ordained. If it is the judge who
interprets a precept for the purpose of applying it to a con-
crete case, that interpretation does not have binding force
generally, but rather serves as the basis of an individual-
ized norm: The order of court that is dictated.6 If, finally, a
lawyer or any other private individual interprets a legisla-
tive disposition, his interpretation (whether correct or in-
correct) has merely doctrinal value and, hence, binds no
one.
In the first case, we are speaking of authentic interpre-
tation; in the second, judicial or jurisprudential interpreta-
tion and, in the third, doctrinal or private interpretation.
In the case of obligatory jurisprudence, speaking of cer-
tain tribunals such as our own [Mexican] Supreme Court,
the theses established by them are obligatory for inferior
authorities and, in this sense, can be considered norms of
interpretation of certain statutes. One must carefully dis-
tinguish between the judicial decisions which, through
their repetition, cause the jurisprudence to be formed, and
the theses contained in those resolutions .... The thesis
contained in them, that is, the obligatory jurisprudence, has
a different scope than the five orders individually consid-
ered. For while the orders are individualized norms, refer-
ring concretely to the respective cases that they resolve, the
obligatory jurisprudence is equivalent to a general norm of
6. Footnote omitted by translator.
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interpretation or of integration, which obligates the judicial
tribunals.
171. Interpretation of General Precepts and
Individualized Norms
Hermeneutic work does not refer only to legal precepts
of general application; it also may be directed toward indi-
vidual norms. This happens, for example, when one inter-
prets a contract, a will, or an administrative resolution. To
interpret a contract is to inquire into the meaning or sense
of its clauses, for the purpose of discovering the contractual
norm. As in the case of statutes, in the case of contracts,
wills, administrative resolutions, etc., one must distinguish
the expression of the norm from the norm that is expressed.
The difference is that in the case of the statute the norm
expressed is general and abstract, while in the other cases
the norms obligate only certain persons.
172. Methods and Schools of Interpretation
Until now we have limited ourselves to defining the
task of interpretation and pointing out the goal, but we
have said nothing of the methods that the interpreter
should use.
Interpretation is an art and, consequently, has its own
special technique. But as every technique supposes the
correct use of a series of methods for the achievement of
certain goals, it is necessary to study the methods of inter-
pretation, because the success of the interpreter's activity
will depend on the suitability of the procedures that he
utilizes.
With respect to the question of the methodology to be
employed, the differences among the writers are as pro-
found as are their differences over the concept of interpre-
tation and the definition of the meaning of the law. If, for
example, one believes that the goal of interpretation is the
19981
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
discovery of the intention of the legislator, the study of pre-
paratory drafts and statements of purpose will acquire an
importance incomparably greater than that given by one
who follows the logical-systematic conception of the legal
order.
The methods of interpretation are numerous. The dif-
ferences among them derive fundamentally from the dif-
fering conceptions that their defenders have concerning the
significance of the legal texts and from the doctrines that
they profess about law in general.
The various schools of interpretation divide on the ba-
sis of completely different conceptions of the juridical order
and the meaning of the task of interpretation. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the methods that they propose differ
so profoundly!
In the pages that follow we shall study the principal
schools of interpretation and, after reviewing each of them,
we shall try to establish its value, in order to be able, later
on, to knowledgeably expound our own point of view.
XXIV. THE EXEGETIC METHOD
173. Interpretation as Exegesis of Statutes
We will begin our study of the principal hermeneutic
methods with a brief discussion of the traditional, or exe-
getic, method. We will do this by proceeding to review, step
by step, as faithfully as possible, the doctrine of the Exe-
getic School set forth in the first volume of the magisterial
work of Franqois G6ny, Mdthode dinterprdtation et sources
en droit priv6 positif.
The inspirational thought of the aforementioned school
was first formulated in the paper L'autoritg de la loi, pre-
sented by the French jurist Blondeau to the Academy of
Moral and Political Sciences in 1841. According to Blon-
7. Footnote omitted by translator.
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deau, judicial decisions must be based only on the statute.
This jurisconsult acknowledges the legitimacy of interpre-
tation, but only in the sense of exegesis of the texts. Conse-
quently, from that point of departure, he rejects "the false
sources of decision, according to which one purports to sub-
stitute for the will of the legislator." Precedents, usages not
authorized by statute, considerations of general utility, eq-
uity, maxims, doctrines, etc. And he goes to the extreme of
contending that if the judge is faced with two contradictory
statutes, making it impossible to discover the will of the
legislator, the judge should refrain from judging, treat both
[statutory] precepts as nonexistent and dismiss the com-
plaint.
The idea that every interpretation is always the exege-
sis of the texts dominates and directs the teachings of the
most illustrious French jurisconsults of the second half of
the last [i.e., 19th] century: Demante, Marcad6, De-
molombe, Aubry et Rau, Laurent and Baudry-Lacantinerie.
Among the arguments advanced in support of this the-
sis, the first is that the wealth of legislation, beginning with
the epoch of the great codifications, and, especially since
the promulgation of the Napoleonic Code, makes almost
impossible the existence of unforeseen cases. "Those [cases]
with respect to which the statutory law is truly omissive
are extremely rare, and their resolution can almost always
be found by recourse to analogy."8 Since, for the defenders
of this doctrine, the statute is the expression of the will of
the legislator, the interpretation of statutory precepts must
be limited to the search for the thinking of their author.
This task, whose ultimate end is the discovery of the inten-
tion of the legislators, is precisely what is called exegesis.
One must follow the texts, step by step, said Demolombe,
until one encounters the thinking of those who formulated
them.
8. THOMAS HUC, I COMMENTAIRE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL
165 (1892), as cited in FRANCOIS GNY,I MPTHODE D'INTERPRPTATION ET SOURCES
EN DROIT PRIV9 POSITIF 30 (2d ed. 1954).
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Thus, interpretation, from that point of view, is the
clarification of the texts, not interpretation of the law. "I
know nothing of the civil law," exclaimed Bugnet, "I know
only the Code Napole6n."9
174. The Exegetical Method
The work of exegesis is not always difficult. The legal
text may be clear, so clear that it raises no doubt about the
thinking of its drafters. In such a situation, it should be
applied according to its terms. "When a statute is clear, it
is not legitimate to avoid its letter under the pretext of
reaching its spirit." ° In this situation, the resulting inter-
pretation is purely grammatical.
Sometimes, nevertheless, the expression [of the stat-
ute] is obscure or incomplete. Then a grammatical exami-
nation is not enough, and it is necessary to employ what is
called logical interpretation. Its goal is to discover the spirit
of the statute, "in order to control, complete, restrict, or ex-
tend its letter."1 It is necesasry to search for the thought of
the legislator in the totality of circumstances extrinsic to
the [grammatical] formulation and, above all, in those cir-
cumstances which governed its appearance. The subsidiary
methods which the interpreter should utilize to achieve this
are the following:
1. Examination of the preparatory works, statements
of purpose, and parliamentary debates.
2. Analysis of historical tradition and custom, in order
to learn the conditions which prevailed in the epoch in
which the statute was drafted as well as the motives which
led the legislator to adopt it.
3. If the foregoing methods prove fruitless, one must
make use of indirect procedures. Among these, in the first
9. GtNy, supra note 8, at 30.
10. FENET, I RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRPPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL,
T. II. P. 7, as cited in GPNY, supra note 8, at 30-31 n.1.
11. R. VON JHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHES RECHTS, as quoted in GPNY, su-
pra note 8, at 32.
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rank, are recourse to equity and the application of general
principles of law. Equity must not be for the interpreter
the immediate and direct source of inspiration, but rather a
criterion which permits discovery of considerations of util-
ity and justice which must have inspired the legislator.
That which is sought is thus the will-actual or pre-
sumed-of the drafters of the statute. General principles of
law are conceived of as the body of ideals of reason and jus-
tice which the legislator must have had in mind in any
event. From this it is inferred that they may serve to com-
plete the [written] expression of [the legislator's] thought.
175. Unforeseen Cases
Unfortunately, the processes which we have described
above do not always permit us to discover the meaning of
the statute, because there are situations which the legisla-
tor could not foresee. But even in this situation, the legal
method is able to achieve the solution that is sought. One
must then utilize the resources which formal logic offers the
interpreter. We shall enumerate the most important of
these:
1. Argument to the Contrary
When a legal text contains a restrictive provision.. .one
may infer that those things not included within it should be
objects of a contrary result. For example: Article 8 of the
[Mexican] Federal Constitution provides that, in political
matters, "only citizens of the Republic may make use of the
right of petition." Interpreting to the contrary the foregoing
precept, one arrives logically at the conclusion that those
who are not citizens, a foreigner, for instance, or a minor,
may not make use, in a political matter, of that right.
2. Arguments a Pari, a Majori, a Minore ad Majus
These arguments constitute, together and in combina-
tion, what is called reasoning by analogy. Arguments of
1998]
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this type are based on the idea that in all those cases in-
volving the same juridical principle [raz6n juridica], the re-
sult should be the same. (Ubi eadem ratio, idem jus). In
order that analogical reasoning be applied correctly, it is
not enough that there be factual similarity between the two
situations, the one foreseen and the one not foreseen by the
statute; it is also necesasry that the principle [raz6n] on
which the statutory rule is based, exist as well with respect
to the unforeseen case. That which may justify the applica-
tion of analogy is, thus, "substantial juridical identity." The
application [of analogy] is undertaken because there exists
an identity or parity of purposes (argument a pari), or be-
cause there is a larger principle [involved] (argument a mi-
nori ad majus). "All of these arguments are different appli-
cations of the same scientific process, and they always
entail profound analysis of the provisions of the statute,
with a view to discovering the fundamental principle which
has inspired it (ratio juris). The ratio juris having been dis-
covered, extensive application is possible, unless the legal
provision contains an exception [to such extension] (exceptio
est strictissimae interpretationis).""
In the aforementioned cases one always presumes the
existence of a legislative will. "When we permit ourselves
to extend by analogy a legal formula to cases not foreseen
by it, we do so convinced that the legislator logically would
have desired that solution, if he had been aware of the
situation.""3
176. The Role of Custom and Equity
What should one do when logic is not sufficient to en-
able one to discover the thought of the legislator? Is it
proper to pay attention to custom or to take into account
standards of equity?




On this point the opinions of the jurists of the Exegeti-
cal School are not in agreement.
With respect to custom, almost all of them deny that it
is a true source of law. Using as their point of departure
the doctrine of the division of powers, eulogized by Montes-
quieu, they maintain that the formulation of law belongs
exclusively to the legislative power. It would be appropri-
ate to have recourse to custom only when the statute so
provides, or when, in case of doubt, the examination of cus-
tom will enable one to discover the thinking of the legisla-
tor. Nevertheless, this position is not defended by all of the
French jurists of the nineteenth century. Among those who
oppose it one must mention Demante;1" A. Boistel 5 and Ch.
Beudant."6 "Making use of examples taken from legal his-
tory, Ch. Beudant demonstrated the falsity of the opinion
which, by ignoring the creative force of this primordial
source of law, and in spite of the dialectical efforts of its ad-
herents, clashes with overwhelming and unavoidable prac-
tical experience." 7
The attitude of the followers of the Exegetical School is
not very different with respect to general principles of law.
What must the interpreter do in those cases-rare but
within the realm of possibility-in which the statutory law
presents gaps that cannot be filled-in with the aid of anal-
ogy? Some authors, such as Blondeau, Huc, and De-
molombe" maintain that in such a situation, the judge
should dismiss the complaint since the plaintiff cannot in-
voke, as the basis of his claim, a positive law. But this ex-
treme solution is not in accord with the principle set forth
in article 4 of the French Civil Code, according to which no
judge may refrain from judging on the pretext of the si-
lence, obscurity or insufficiency of the statutes. For this
reason almost all exegetes distance themselves on this
14. 20 & 30 COURS ANALITIQUE, t., 11, 15.
15. 518 COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT, t. II, 413-415 (1899).
16. 54-56 COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, Introduction, 61-65 (1896); 105
COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(QAIS 110-112.
17. GPNY, supra note 8, at 38.
18. G9NY, supra note 8, at 39.
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point from the position of Blondeau, and maintain that the
judges should fill the gaps in the statutes in accordance
with the principles of justice and equity which, it is as-
sumed, always inspire the work of the legislator. But-as
Gdny says-"this concession is made unwillingly, as some-
thing hopelessly unavoidable, whose reach they seek to re-
strict with the statement, made more or less sincerely, that
equity can be found in the statute itself, at least in germi-
nal form, thanks to inductive reasoning.""
XXVII. STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS
186. Relationships Between Statutes and
Judicial Decisions
If we examine the relationships that can exist between
judicial decisions and statutes, we will find that they are of
three classes: (a) decisions based on a statute, (b) decisions
in the absence of a statute, and (c) decisions contrary to
statute (secundum legem, praeter legem and contra legem).
In the present chapter we will deal with the first group,
that is, decisions based on a statute. This group is of inter-
est primarily from the point of view of interpretation, since,
as we have already said, interpretation presupposes the
existence of a precept to be interpreted. When there is no
statute relating to a concrete question, one does not speak
of interpretation, but rather of integration.
Our point of departure is, then, the following question:
When a concrete case is foreseen by statute, how should the
judicial tribunal proceed?
The foregoing question is answered by saying that the
judge is subject to the statute. The reasons for this subjec-




a) The mission of the judges and the tribunals consists
of the application of objective law to individual cases. Now
then: If the formulation and determination of the law in
modern States is done fundamentally by statute, it is obvi-
ous that, when the statute exists, the judicial organs must
subject themselves to it.
b) As the proximate end of law is order (footnote omit-
ted), and the best way of assuring order is by giving to legal
precepts the clarity, steadiness, and permanence of written
statutes, then those statutes should be faithfully respected
by the tribunals.
c) The idea of order is closely tied to publicity of the
law. Insofar as possible, the law should be known by eve-
ryone, and the best method of making it known is to put it
in writing. But it would be useless to write down the law if
its official formulation (contained in the statute) were not
respected by the organs charged with applying it.
d) The law must be the same for everyone. This same-
ness is achieved most easily when the law is formulated by
means of written precepts, so that everyone may know it
and it may be applied without distinction as to persons.
e) Another postulate of the law is unity. But custom-
ary law tends to change from region to region. On the other
hand, the existence of general statutes, to which the judge
is subject, favors the unity of the legal order. The require-
ment of unity is another of the reasons that justify the
submission of the judge to duly-promulgated statutes.
f) Respect for the statutes on the part of the judges is,
in the final analysis, the best guarantee of true liberty. The
citizen should not be exposed to caprice and arbitrariness,
but rather subject to a fixed justice that is administered in
accordance with principles that are officially established
and clearly identifiable. Such a desirable state of affairs
could not be achieved if the judge were given the power to
separate himself from the statute when it foresees the case
submitted to him for decision."
20. HANS REICHEL, LA LEY Y LA SENTENCIA (Emiho Minana Villagrasa,
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187. The Meaning of the Statute and the Will
of the Legislator
We have said in the foregoing section that when there
is a statute applicable to a concrete case, the judges and the
tribunals must subject themselves to it. But it must not be
forgotten that the statement that the law foresees a juridi-
cal situation, presupposes a prior exegesis of the text.
From this point of view, interpretation is a task anterior to
the act by which objective law is applied. He who ignores
that fact falls victim to the false belief that there are stat-
utes that do not require interpretation.
In section [III.(B)., supra,] we said that the central
problem of the theory of interpretation lies in knowing
what is to be understood by the meaning [sentido] of the
texts. Separating ourselves at this point from the road fol-
lowed by G~ny and the Exegetical School, we think that the
meaning of the statute is not the will of the legislator. If the
doctrine referred to were correct, one would have to admit
that in all those cases in which it is not possible to discover
the will of the legislator, there is no juridical interpretation.
Wanting (in the psychological sense) is something of
which only a conscient and thinking being is capable; but
the legislator, as a mere personification, does not meet
those requirements. That which might be considered his
will, in the psychological sphere, is at most a product of the
conflicting forces of those individuals who incidentally take
part in the legislative task.
The problem here presented and the investigation in
pursuit of the will of the legislator lead, in reality, to all
kinds of absurdities. One would have to follow the trail
of bills, preliminary drafts of bills, counterproposals,
working drafts, preliminary discussions, presentations
to committees, minutes of legislative sessions, reports,
etc. One would even have to interpret carefully the




Commission, the improvised argument of an affable but
uninformed representative, and thereafter distill all of
this into the will of the legislator. Even if one obtained
the testimony of every member of the legislature about
what they thought, planned, and proposed, the legisla-
tor's will would still be missing. All of this [theory of
the wish of the legislator] is fundamentally erroneous
from a psychological point of view. The statute is the
general will, not the will of a governing group, imperial
or national. What Franz Klein thought when he pre-
pared his draft law of civil procedure, or Eugene Huber
thought upon editing the civil law, are jurisprudentially
irrelevant.
21
The foregoing does not mean that preparatory works
lack importance. Consulting them is often very useful, not
because they may permit one to learn the will of those who
drafted the statute, but because they are helpful in discov-
ering its objective meaning.
It is also important to distinguish between the purpose
of the legislator in expressing something legally and that
which is expressed through the formula employed. Let us
suppose that the [legislative] chambers propose to enact a
law providing that, if before the delivery of a thing sold,
that thing is accidentally destroyed, the seller is obligated
to indemnify the buyer. What the legislator wants is to
formulate a norm; but the meaning should not be confused
with that purpose. The rule of law is not an expression of a
will, but of a duty, whose birth is conditioned upon the re-
alization of a juridical hypothesis. Perhaps one can say
that the legislator wishes that if the item sold is destroyed
accidentally before it is delivered to the buyer, the seller
indemnify the buyer; but, even so, the juridical rule, once
formulated, does not involve a desire, but rather an obliga-
tion, because, were the contrary true, it would not be an
authentic norm. In other words: The mission of the legisla-
tors is not to give expression to what they want, but rather
to what juridically must be.
21. REICHEL, supra note 20, at 60.
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Moreover, the texts of the laws constitute the official
expression of the law. If this principle is admitted, one will
have to accept that elements extraneous to the formula may
be taken into account only as aids in the interpretative
task, for the purpose of discovering the meaning of the law,
but never as data capable of bringing about a correction or
modification of the law. Nevertheless, interpretation does
not make reference to statutory precepts considered in iso-
lation, but rather as elements or parts of a systematic
whole, free of contradictions.
To interpret the statutes is, therefore, to look for the
law applicable to concrete cases, by means of an official
formula. This interpretation should not be limited to the
single formula itself, but rather must be carried out in a
systematic connection to the entire body of statutory law in
effect. In order to achieve this end, the interpreter may
avail himself of elements extraneous to the text, but those
elements should be seen simply as means of clarifying the
meaning of the statute.
188. The Hermetic Completeness of the
Juridical Order
When one speaks of the hermetic completeness of the
juridical order, one means that there is no situation that
cannot be resolved juridically, that is, in accordance with
legal principles. It has been argued that in all of those
cases in which there is no statutory precept that foresees
the concrete situation, the situation can be resolved ac-
cording to the rule that all that is not regulated is permit-
ted.2 Such a doctrine leads in a straight line to the nega-
tion of "gaps." In light of the transcendency of this
assertion, we do not want to proceed without reviewing,
however briefly, the arguments on which it rests. We will
base our review on the famous study by Zitelmann
22. The correct statement is: All that is not prohibited, is permitted.




Every controversy submitted to a tribunal for decision,
says Zitelmann, must be resolved, and resolved juridically.
From this point of view one always arrives at the conclusion
that the law lacks gaps, because the gaps in legislation
must be filled in by the judge, not in an arbitrary manner,
but rather by the application of juridical principles. The
most accurate way to say this is that before the deficiencies
of legislation are filled in, the law appears before us full of
gaps, and that, when these gaps are filled in, the law pres-
ents itself as a perfect totality. Or, in other words, if in the
statutes there are gaps, in the law there cannot be.
The best demonstration of the foregoing is that, in
dealing with those situations not foreseen by the legislator,
the judge may properly decide that the facts produce no le-
gal effects, since a fact produces juridical consequences only
when a statute so provides.
For greater clarity, we will examine some of the exam-
ples offered by Zitelmann.
According to the former German Commercial Code, an
offer made to one who is present is considered rejected un-
less it is accepted immediately, whereas an offeree who is
absent is allowed a certain amount of time within which to
respond. With the advent of the telephone, jurists began to
ask themselves whether acceptance of an offer should be
subject to the rules governing the formation of contracts be-
tween absent persons. It was thought that there was a gap
in the Code, and so the new Code contained a provision that
an acceptance by telephone should be governed by the same
rule as applies to contracts between persons who are in
each other's presence.
But, in the opinion of Zitelmann, there was no real gap
in the old Code, because a contract between a person in
Berlin and a person in Bonn is unquestionably a contract
between absent persons and the old Code contained rules
governing that type of transaction. What really happened
here is that [the drafters of the new Code] considered it in-
appropriate, in the special case of acceptance by telephone,
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to apply the rules that govern an offer made to an absent
person.
Another example: The German Civil Code provides
that the risk of loss of goods passes to the buyer only upon
delivery, unless the goods are sent from one city to another,
in which case the buyer bears the risks of shipment.
Let us suppose that a person buys a mirror in North
Bonn, and asks that it be sent to his home, which is in
South Bonn. On the road the mirror is broken by a boy who
throws a stone and then disappears. As the statute does
not foresee the case of shipment within the same city, who
must bear the loss?
In the case of a shipment from South Bonn to Godesberg
(a town close to Bonn), the risk would be on the buyer.
Should this not also be so on an equally long road
within Bonn?... [The] Supreme Hanseatic Tribunal of
Hamburg has recently decided the case by analogy,
placing the risk on the buyer. I myself participated in
the decision. 4
But the rule given by the Code is different: It deals with the
shipment from one city to another. It means that if the
mirror is sent from one point to another in the city of Bonn,
and on the way it is broken accidentally, the loss shall be
borne by the seller. Here, when a judge declares that there
is a gap which should be filled by applying the norm that
governs shipment from one city to another, he is not really
filling a void; he is failing to apply positive law and is for-
mulating a new norm, one that he considers more just.
There are situations in which the statute establishes a
general rule and leaves some points undetermined, thus
obligating the judge to make those determinations, without
which the rule could not be applied at all.
Let us suppose that a statute provides that, under
such-and-such circumstances, an association must elect a
certain officer, but the statute says nothing about the man-
24. Id. at 740.
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ner of election. In such a situation, any electoral procedure
would be valid because the absence of rules about the form
of the election does not destroy the duty to conduct it.
The foregoing review requires us to ask again if there
really are gaps. We believe that the answer must be: The
law has none; but legislation necessarily does have them.
But a new question arises: Which are the real gaps? In or-
der to proceed methodically, we will try to respond to this
question in relation to the two cases of which Zitelmann
speaks.
We refer first to that example in which the statute pro-
vides a general solution that is not well-adapted to all that
it embraces, so that its application to one or another such
situation strikes the judge as unjust (the example of the
mirror). The question is reduced, in this hypothetical, to
one of determining whether the general rule (the seller
bears the risk until the moment of delivery) should or
should not be applied in the special case of an accident oc-
curring during the transfer of an item from one point to an-
other within the same city. If the general rule is considered
by itself, unquestionably the hypothetical case is resolved
by it. But if one considers not only this rule, but rather the
system established by the legislation and, particularly, the
principle that the buyer must bear the risk when he causes
the goods to be sent from one city to another, then there is
no doubt that we are faced with a gap, because the sense of
the legislation on this subject can be nothing other than
that the seller bears risk until the moment of delivery, pro-
vided that the buyer does not ask that the item be sent
from one point to another, thereby creating a greater risk.
The sense of the legislation is clarified by the special rule,
which reveals the true extent of the general rule. The gen-
eral rule should be applied only if the buyer does not re-
quest the shipment of the item from one point to another,
because then the buyer will have created a new risk, which
he should bear. Now then: Since the law foresaw only the
case of the shipment of the item from one city to another
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and not from one location to another within the same city,
the existence of a gap cannot be doubted.
Turning to the second example, the existence of a gap
is even clearer. The statute imposes a duty or grants a
right, but does not specify the methods of carrying out the
duty or exercising the right. This means that the statute
leaves a margin of liberty and authorizes a number of pos-
sibilities among which there is room for valid options.
XXVIII. PROCESSES OF INTEGRATION
189. The Problem of Integration
The exercises carried out in the preceding chapter lead
us to the conclusion that legislation has gaps, while the law
cannot have them. The existence of these gaps marks the
boundary of the task of interpretation as such. When a
judge called upon to resolve a controversy discovers that
the rules of interpretation are unable to provide him with
the rule of decision that he seeks, he must, in order to carry
out his specific mission, formulate the norm applicable to
the case or, what is the same thing, he must cease being an
interpreter and assume a role much like that of a legislator.
How should the judge proceed to fill up the voids? Of-
ten, the legislation foresees the possibility of gaps, and in-
dicates to the judges the methods that they must use in or-
der to fill them. In civil matters, for example, it refers them
to the general principles of law, or requires that the judge
resolve the case in the same way that the legislator would
have resolved it.
The first thing that the judge must investigate is
whether there are within the legal system general rules of
integration. If there are, he is subject to them; if there are
none, he must apply the principles that juridical science of-
fers. This means that it is not indispensable that the legal
system contain such rules in order that the judicial function
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be performed. Since the judge has in each case the duty to
resolve the dispute, within the scope of his powers, the in-
sufficiency of the legislation does not relieve him of that
obligation. 5
In the present [section] we will examine the most im-
portant methods of integration, along with some of the
theories that have been developed around them. We shall
speak first of analogy, and thereafter of equity and general
principles of law.
The study of analogy belongs in this chapter because,
as G~ny's arguments reveal, the process of analogy is not a
hermeneutic method. If analogy consists in applying to an
unforeseen situation a rule concerning a situation that is
foreseen, when there is similarity between the two situa-
tions and there exists the same juridical reason to resolve
the two situations in the same manner, that process is out-
side the ambit of interpretation, since there is interpreta-
tion only when there is a precept with which the interpreter
may work.
190. Analogy as a Method of Integration
Modern studies of the role that analogy plays in law
demonstrate that analogy is not a purely logical process,
since judgments of value are always part of the process.
[Tihe application of analogy supposes the existence of
two juridically analogous situations, one foreseen by statute
and the other not foreseen.
25. "The judge must always judge, because the norm that determines that he
shall judge is a knowable assumption of the law, independent of the action of the
legislator, with logical, a priori validity for the positive law itself and, therefore,
for the legislator who is, in turn, also an organ of the law." CARLOS COSSIO, THE






Legal precept: a, b, c, d
Case foreseen: a. b. c. d
Case not foreseen: a. b. c. e
Let us suppose that the legal precept states the fol-
lowing: If a, b, c, and d are, then X shall be. This means
that upon the realization of the hypothetical a, b, c, d, ipso
facto there is realized the juridical consequence X, ex-
pressed in the precept. Let us imagine now that a tribunal
must decide the case a, b, c, e, not foreseen by statute, and
the tribunal finds that the same juridical reason exists for
resolving the case in the same way as the case a, b, c, d, the
analogue of the actual case. The judge then reasons analo-
gously and attributes to the unforeseen case the juridical
consequences that the statute produces in the foreseen
case.
It is commonly said that the norm that governs the
foreseen case is applied analogically to the unforeseen one.
However, this form of expression is inaccurate, because
that which is applied to the unforeseen case is not the legal
precept that resolves the analogous case, but rather a new
norm, which has a different supposition. The result for-
mulated analogically is identical to that of the precept that
foresaw the similar case, but the suppositions are different.
Returning to the example we may say that the case a, b, c,
d is foreseen by the legal precept that links the result then
X shall be to the realization of the supposition a, b, c, d; in-
sofar as the unforeseen case (a, b, c, e) is resolved by the
application of a norm whose supposition is that realized by
conditions a, b, c, e, then the result coincides with that of
the statutory rule.
Analogy consists, then, in attributing to partially iden-
tical situations (one foreseen by statute and the other not
foreseen), the legal consequences indicated by the rule ap-
plicable to the situation that was foreseen. This is equiva-
lent to formulating a new norm whose supposition ex-
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presses abstractly the characteristics of the unforeseen
case, and attributes to that case the consequences that the
foreseen supposition would have produced, although there
is only a partial identity between the two. The conclusion
to be drawn from this is that one should not speak of the
analogical application of a precept to an unforeseen case,
but rather of the creation or analogical formulation of a
new norm, whose result is identical to that of the other pre-
cept, but whose suppositions are only similar.
Up to this point we have discussed the logical mecha-
nism of reasoning by analogy. But we have already indi-
cated that the juridical analogy or, more accurately, juridi-
cal reasoning by analogy, supposes a prior value judgment
about two fact situations, the one foreseen and the one not
foreseen. What justifies the application of a result provided
for in one statute to a case not foreseen in the hypothesis of
the statute is not the simple analogy of situations, but
rather the same reasons for deciding the one and the other
in the same way. Now then, to decide if the two fact situa-
tions should produce the same legal consequences is not a
logical problem, but rather an axiological one, since it pre-
supposes a value judgment about the two.
26
In order to conclude the study of the processes of inte-
gration we need only consider equity and general principles
of law. We will now speak of them.
191. General Principles of Law
Almost all modern codes provide that, in those cases in
which it is not possible to resolve a juridical situation in ac-
cordance with analogy, one should have recourse to the
general principles of law. Among us [Mexicans,] article 14
of the Federal Constitution and article 19 of the Civil Code
make those principles the last recourse of which the judge
may avail himself in order to decide questions presented to
him.
26. See also C. COSSIO, LA PLENITUD DEL ORDEN JuRiDiCo 34 (1939).
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Determining what is meant by general principles of law
(emphasis added) is one of the most controversial subjects
in legal literature. Some writers take the position that the
way to discover the general principles is to ascend, by ever
increasing generalization, from statutory provisions to
rules ever more broad, until one arrives at the point where
the doubtful case comes within the scope of one of those
rules. 7
For some scholars, general principles of law are the
principles of Roman law; some argue that general princi-
ples are those acknowledged by science; and, finally, others
identify them with the principles of first, or natural, law.
In an admirable monograph, Del Vecchio has demonstrated
that this last opinion is the only correct one.2 8
When one asserts that the general principles of law are
the principles of natural law, one means that, in the ab-
sence of a formally valid provision, the decision-maker must
formulate a principle endowed with intrinsic validity, in or-
der to resolve the concrete question submitted to him. This
27. "All legislation being a totality of norms that have an intimate connec-
tion with each other, even though the connection is not always apparent, given the
unity of the goal which is the ordered human utility, and the unity of the funda-
mental idea, which is that of justice, legislation can be considered an organism
that has its own power, however latent, of expansion and adaptation...." Gen-
eral principles of law are "the fundamental principles of positive legislation, which
are not found written in any statute, but which are the logical presuppositions
necessary to the various legislative norms, from which [norms] by the power of
abstraction the general principles may be deduced. These principles may in fact
be higher rational principles, or principles of social ethics, or principles of Roman
law, universally acknowledged by doctrine; but they have value not because they
are purely rational, ethical, or Roman and scientific, but rather because they have
effectively informed the positive system of our law and have in this way come to
be operating principles of positive law." LEONARDO COVIELLO, GENERAL
DOCTRINE OF CIVIL LAW 96 (1938). The same opinion is given by Francesco Car-
nelutti. General principles of law, says this author, "are not something that exist
outside, but rather inside the written law itself, since they derive from the estab-
lished norms. They are found within the written law as alcohol is found within
the wine; they are the spirit or the essence of the written law. FRANCESCO
CARNELUTIi, THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW: FUNCTION AND
COMPOSITION OF PROCEDURE 120 (1936).
28. See GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW (Felix Forte,
trans., 1956)
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precludes, therefore, the legal possibility of his deciding on
the basis of his personal opinions.
Another limitation must be accepted as well: The gen-
eral principles that serve as the basis for filling in the gaps
in statutory law must never be in opposition to the precepts
contained in the statutes. This requirement
is based essentially on the nature of the legal system,
which must constitute a singular and homogeneous
whole, a true logical organism, capable of supplying a
norm that is certain-not ambiguous and certainly not
contradictory-for every possible relationship. The in-
trinsic congruency of the various parts that make up the
system must be shown and confirmed, at all times, in
the relationship of particular norms to each other and to
the general principles with which they are related; only
in this way will the jurist be able to master the internal
spirit of the system and proceed in accordance with that
system in particular applications, avoiding the errors
that could easily arise from the isolated consideration of
one norm or another.29
One must not lose sight of the fact that in all those
cases in which the formal sources [of law] fail to provide the
judge with a criterion for solving the matter, the judge is
placed in a position similar to that of the legislator. For,
just as the legislator, in carrying out his activity, is con-
cerned with transforming into formally valid precepts the
general principles of law or, better said, the demands of jus-
tice, the judge is obligated to establish the norms of deci-
sion for the unforeseen cases, not arbitrarily, but in the
same form in which the legislator would have done if he
had had the unforeseen cases before him. The only differ-
ence between the two situations is that the legislator must
formulate rules of an abstract kind, applicable to an indefi-
nite number of cases, while the judge must discover the




If one acknowledges that the legislator must never lose
sight of the general principles [of law], one would have to
accept as well that the juridical order is, to a greater or
lesser extent, the realization of those principles, and that
returning to them when the legislator maintains silence, is
equivalent to completing, in a harmonious and coherent
manner, the legislative task.
Therefore, we believe that the most felicitous formula
of integration that has been coined is that set forth in arti-
cle 1 of the Swiss Civil Code, which states:
The statute governs all matters referred to by the letter
or the spirit of any of its provisions. In the absence of
an applicable statutory provision, the judge shall re-
solve the matter in accordance with customary law and,
in the absence of custom, in accordance with the rules
that he would establish if he had to proceed as a legisla-
tor. He shall be informed by the solutions provided by
doctrine and jurisprudence.
192. The Classical Concept of Equity
What is meant by equity, and what function does it
perform in the juridical life of a country, are questions
whose difficulty, as theoretical problems, are directly re-
lated to their importance as practical problems.
The classical concept of equity was stated, with inimi-
table precision and clarity, by Aristotle. The definition
given by the Master of Estagera remains the one most
widely accepted by jurists. Equity, according to Alexander's
preceptor performs the function of a corrective. It is a rem-
edy that the decisionmaker applies in order to repair the
defects caused by the generality of the written law. Stat-
utes are, by their nature, general statements. Because of
their breadth, they cannot embrace all cases. There are a
multiplicity of situations that escape the foresight of even
the most sagacious legislator. The faithful application of a
[30:1
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norm to a given situation may sometimes be unsuitable or
unjust. In such circumstances, the judge may call upon eq-
uity to temper the rigorousness of a formula that is too gen-
eral. Equity is, therefore, in the Aristotelian conception, a
virtue of the decisionmaker.
Note how the philosopher distinguishes the notions of
equity and justice:
That which is equitable and that which is just are one
and the same thing; and, both being good, the only dif-
ference between them is that the equitable is even bet-
ter. The difficulty is that the equitable, being just, is
not legal justice, but rather a happy rectification of rig-
orously legal justice. The cause of this difference is that
the statute is necessarily always general, and there are
some matters about which one cannot properly legislate
by means of general provisions. In those cases, then, in
which it is necessary to speak universally, but it is not
possible to do so well, the legislator bases the statute on
the usual situation, though not because of ignorance or
oversight. The statute is not for this reason any less
good: the shortcoming is not in the statute; neither is it
in the legislator who dictated the law; it is entirely in
the nature of things, because this is precisely the situa-
tion with all practical things. It follows that when the
statute provides a general rule, and in particular cases
there is something exceptional, then, seeing that the
legislator is silent or was mistaken in speaking in gen-
eral terms, it is necessary to correct him and make up
for his silence, and to speak in his place, as he would
have done if he had been aware of the particular cases
being dealt with. The essence of the equitable is that it
consists precisely in the reestablishment of the law in
those areas which the law has overlooked because of the
general terms in which it speaks. When the thing is in-
definite, the rule also must be indefinite, like the leaden
rule used in the architecture of Lesbos, the rule adapts
itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so
too the judgment is adapted to the facts.30
30. ARisToTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETmcs, Book V, Chapter X.
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Recourse to equity, according to Aristotle, permits the
correction of the generality of the statute, and the replace-
ment of abstract legal justice by the absolute justice of the
concrete case. Does this mean that the role of equity is
necessarily that of a corrective of the law? Might equity not
also perform a supplementary function, when there are no
precepts applicable to a specific situation, and the judge has
exhausted the resources that legal interpretation offers
him?
193. Equity and General Principles of Law
On the relationship between equity and general princi-
ples of law the literature is abundant. For those who wish
to gain an appreciation of the importance which the writers
give this problem, it will be enough to read Mario Rotondi's
Equity and General Principles of Law... or the short com-
pendious treatise of Professor Del Vecchio, General Princi-
ples of Law.
There are two principal positions taken by contempo-
rary jurists on the question before us. Some, such as Pac-
chioni31 and Rotondi32, deny the possibility of identifying
equity with the general principles of law. Others, such as
Osilia"3 and Maggiore,' make equity a general principle of
law.
[The author here reviews the opinions of a number of
scholars on the subject.]
[WIe believe that in any case equity must be consid-
ered a general principle of law, and, indeed, the first or su-
preme principle of law, since it serves as the basis for all
31. See GIovANNI PAccHiONI: CORSO DI DIRITTO CIVILE. DELLE LEGGI
GENERAlES DE DERECHO (1933).
32. See MARIO ROTONDI, EQUIDAD Y PRINCIPIOS GENERALES DE DERECHO.
33. See ELIO OsILIA, L'EQUITA NEL DRIMTO PRIVATO (1923).
34. See GIUSEPPE MAGGIORE, L'EQUITA E IL SUO VALORE NEL DIRITrO.
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others. Because if one makes a positive interpretation of
the term, "general principles of law," and maintains that, in
order to ascertain them, the judge must raise himself by in-
duction to the most abstract norms that can possibly be ob-
tained, leaving behind the rich multiplicity of provisions of
positive law, one must admit that behind all of this there
pulsates a longing-achieved or not-by all of the authors
to make their precepts just. All positive law represents, as
Gustave Radbruch says very well, "an experiment, unfortu-
nate or happy, to achieve justice." If this is so, if the norm
that commands the legislator to make good and just laws is
the expression of the first of his duties, it cannot be said
that equity differs radically from general principles of law.
Such principles must be just: But to be just is for the legis-
lator a principle, the first principle of action.
The fact that the norm which commands one to make
just laws and give equitable judgments is the supreme
norm, the highest principle, does not authorize us to deny
that that norm is itself a general principle.
If one interpreted in the light of the doctrine of natural
law the matter we have just discussed, the conclusion
would have to be the same. In both situations, his evalua-
tive conscience would indicate to the judge that, without
forgetting the demands of juridical security, or opposing the
provisions of legislation in effect, he must acknowledge the
principle that commands him to be just in the individual
case; and that, in substance, does not differ at all from the
principle that commands the legislator to be just when he
legislates.
[B]ut the principle of equity is, like every norm, general
and abstract, since it applies to an infinite series of cases.
Consequently, it is important not to confuse.. .the act of
application with the norm applied. By calling equity a
norm, we do not mean a positive juridical norm, a precept
written in legislation, but a principle of natural law that
35. Citation omitted by author.
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commands the judge to resolve equitably the conflicts sub-
mitted to him. The basis of the validity of the norm must
be looked for in the value of what is just and in the de-
mands that justice makes. Equity signifies nothing other
than the just solution of individual cases.
Juridical security demands that judges called upon to
resolve a controversy fulfill their task by applying with the
greatest possible fidelity the provisions of the written law;
but when in a particular case there is no applicable statute
and the resources of interpretation have been exhausted,
justice demands, and positive law permits, the judge to be
inspired by criteria of equity, since he is not authorized to
abstain from resolving the dispute. Juridical security is not
diminished by this, because the harmony that must exist in
every system prevents the judge from making a decision
contrary to the legal texts. The juridical order is not ex-
hausted or concluded in a series of generally observed
norms, and it is useful to keep in mind that beside the stat-
utes, subordinate to them and conditioned by them, appear
juridical acts in their infinite variety and multiplicity. Ju-
dicial decisions being the application of norms of a general
character, and having at the same time, relative to their
consequences, the status of authentic norms (individualized
or special, in the terminology of the jurists of the Vienna
School), they should be in harmony with general precepts.
The application of the criterion of equity, in cases in which
there exists a gap in the legislated law, permits a recon-
ciliation of the demands of justice with those of juridical se-
curity, and, thanks to the restriction which we pointed out
above, it makes possible the full realization of the other of
the capital postulates of the life of the law, that is: The co-
herence and harmonic unity of each system.
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XXiX. RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND INTEGRATION IN
MEXICAN LAW
194. Article 14 of the Constitution
The third and fourth paragraphs of article 14 of the
Constitution contain the fundamental rules of interpreta-
tion and integration in Mexican law.36 The third paragraph
refers to the application of criminal statutes; the fourth
formulates the rules of interpretation and integration in
civil matters, but only in relation to judgments. The text of
those provisions is as follows:
In criminal proceedings one may not impose, by simple
analogy or by any other reasoning, any penalty that is
not decreed by a statute exactly applicable to the offense
with which it deals.
In proceedings of a civil nature, the final judgment shall
be in conformity with the letter or the juridical interpre-
tation of the statutory law and, in the absence of that,
shall be based on general principles of law.
We shall first speak of the interpretation of criminal
statutes.
195. Criminal Statutes and Their
Interpretation
The third paragraph of article 14 is not, properly
speaking, a rule of interpretation, but rather a norm that
prohibits the application by analogy of penalties to acts not
considered criminal.
36. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS EsTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 14.
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The principle formulated in that paragraph is the most
important postulate of criminal law. It states that there is
no crime without a statute, and no punishment without a
statute (nullum crimen, nulla peona sine lege). This is to
say, there are no more criminal acts than those that the
criminal statutes define and punish. Neither are there
more penalties than those that the statutes establish.
No one may be punished other than for acts that the
statutes have defined as criminal, nor with penalties
other than those established statutorily.
Thus in this maxim is contained a double individual
guarantee: one may not be punished other than for acts
previously defined by statute as crimes, the criminal
guarantee (nullum crimen sine praevia lege poenali), nor
punished in any ways other than those previously es-
tablished by statute for the act in question, the penal
guarantee (nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali ).
3 7
The same idea may be expressed by saying that stat-
utes are the only source of criminal law, and that criminal
law has no gaps. It prohibits the imposition of punish-
ments by simple analogy or by other reasoning.
Criminal statutes must be applied exactly; but this of
course does not mean that they cannot be interpreted. A
statute is always a way of expressing the law, which means
that it always must be interpreted. What article 14 pro-
hibits is not interpretation, but integration of criminal
statutes, since criminal statutes, by definition, have no
gaps.
In addition to the prohibition of analogical argument,
one must always remember that the application of criminal
statutes is subject to two other principles, namely: (1)
When the statute is obscure, that is, when there is doubt




about its meaning, it should be interpreted in the manner
most favorable to the accused, and (2) Broad interpretation
of a criminal statute is permissible only when it favors the
accused.
196. Interpretation and Integration of Civil
Statutes
The fourth paragraph of article 14 of the Constitution
is a rule not only of interpretation, but also of integration.
It undoubtedly has the defect of referring only to the act by
which a matter is reduced to judgment, as if problems could
arise only when the judge enters judgment. Questions of
interpretation arise not only at the stage of adjudication,
but in every act of application of statutes, at every stage of
the proceedings, from the formulation of the complaint un-
til execution. The rule contained in Article 19 of the Civil
Code is more complete, since it refers generally to the in-
terpretation and integration of civil statutes.
The fourth paragraph of article 14 of the Federal Con-
stitution says in its first part that in matters in the civil or-
der the judgment shall conform to the letter of the law.
Does this mean that civil statutes must be interpreted in a
manner that is purely literal or grammatical? In our opin-
ion, the first part of the fourth paragraph should be under-
stood thus: The civil judge must resolve, in accordance with
the statute, the controversies before him, when the statute
foresees the juridical situation in question. Expressing it in
other words: The judge is bound to the statutory texts, if
they provide the solution to the controversy.
When the meaning of the statute is doubtful, the inter-
preter may make use of all of the resources that the art of
interpretation offers; that is, historical interpretation, logi-
cal interpretation, and systematic interpretation. This is
what the words, "or the juridical interpretation," mean. But
one must not forget that we are dealing with the search for
the meaning of the statute, and that this must not be iden-
tified with the will of the legislator. If the judge's interpre-
tation reveals to him that the case submitted to him for de-
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cision is not foreseen, then he has the obligation to fill in
the gap.
The first problem that now presents itself consists in
determining whether, in dealing with a case not foreseen by
statute, it is possible to resort to custom. The rules con-
tained in the Civil Code of the Federal District show that
custom may be taken into account as a guide to the solution
of conflicts only when expressly authorized by statute. It is
a matter of delegated custom."
Among us, custom may not repeal a statute. "A statute
may be repealed or abrogated only by another, later statute
that either contains an express declaration of repeal, or
contains provisions wholly or partially incompatible with
the earlier statute," Civil Code of the Federal District, arti-
cle 9.40 Article 10 provides: "Against the observance of a
statute one may not allege disuse, custom, or practice to the
contrary."'1
The statement that we made above to the effect that in
civil matters custom is applicable only if a statute so pro-
vides, is based on the following considerations: First, article
14 of the Constitution clearly establishes that in the ab-
sence of a statute, the case shall be resolved in accordance
with general principles of law, which means that recourse
to those principles is the only process of integration
authorized by our basic law; second, in the civil codes of the
country, there is a series of provisions that refer to custom
or usage for the resolution of certain specified conflicts.
This manner of delegation coincides perfectly with the sys-
tem established in article 14.
[The author here quotes from a number of statutes that
expressly authorize the application of custom.]
Another problem presented by the fourth paragraph of
article 14 of the Constitution is that of determining
39. Footnote omitted by translator.
40. CODIGO CIVIL PARA EL DISTRITo FEDERAL [C.C.D.F.], art. 9.
41. C.C.D.F., art 10.
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whether the gaps in the statute law maybe filled by anal-
ogy. In the codes of some countries the judge is directed to
use analogical reasoning and, when that is not sufficient, to
apply general principles. On the other hand, we have al-
ready demonstrated that analogy is not a method of inter-
pretation but of integration, and that it must not be con-
fused with general principles. We believe that the problem,
in regard to civil matters, must be resolved in the following
way: Gaps in civil legislation may be filled analogically in-
sofar as the basis of the analogical reasoning is the general
principle of law that says that justice requires that like
cases be treated alike. But inasmuch as article 14 does not
expressly speak of analogy as a method of integration, but
alludes to it by referring to "general principles of law," it
may be inferred that the civil judge [in Mexico] is not obli-
gated to use analogy, but may instead resolve the unfore-
seen case according to some other general principle of law.
In Italy, on the other hand, the civil judge may seek an
analogical solution and, only as a last resort may he have
recourse to general principles.42
With regard to general principles of law, it is interest-
ing to examine some cases in which the Supreme Court of
Justice has tried to fix the meaning of that expression. In
the judgments dictated in the amparo proceedings brought
by Maria Angelina L6pez de Chdvez" and Otilia Razgado,"
it is said that by general principles of law is not meant the
tradition of the tribunals, which in the final analysis is
nothing more than a group of practices and customs with-
out the force of law; nor the doctrines of the jurisconsults,
which also have no legal force; nor the personal opinions of
the judge; but rather "the principles deposited in some of
our statutes, not only Mexican statutes that have been
promulgated under the Federal Constitution of the country,
but also earlier ones."
42. See NICOLA COVIELLO, DOCTRINO GENERAL DEL DERECHO CIVIL 95
(1924).
43. 43 SEMANARIO JUDICIAL DE LA FEDERACION 858.
44. 50 SEMANARIO JUDICIAL DR LA FEDERACION 283.
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In a judgment entered March 15, 1938, in an amparo
action brought by Catalina Meza de Diaz and others45 the
thesis is advanced that general principles of law are
notorious juridical truths, indisputable, of general char-
acter, as their very name indicates, developed or se-
lected by legal science, in such manner that the judge is
able to give the solution that the legislator would have
given if he had been present, or would have established
if he had foreseen the case; provided that these princi-
ples are not in disharmony with or contradiction to the
group of statutory norms whose gaps must be filled.4
In the first of these theses the Court adopts the crite-
rion that general principles must be inferred from legisla-
tion, meaning by that not only the totality of statutory pro-
visions now in force, but all of those that have ever been in
force in the country. In the second thesis, the Court at-
tempts to make a synthesis of different opinions, even
though they are not compatible with each other. On the
one hand, the thesis asserts that general principles are ju-
ridical truths that are "notorious, indisputable, [and] of
general character, as their very name indicates, developed
or selected by legal science." On the other hand, it is said
that in applying these principles, the judge must be in a po-
sition "to give the solution that the legislator would have
given if he had been present, or would have established if
he had foreseen the case," the rule of the Swiss Code, and,
finally, following the opinion of Del Vecchio, the thesis as-
serts that general principles must be congruent with the
group of statutory norms whose gaps or omissions are to be
filled.
With respect to the first thesis, we have already indi-
cated why it is not acceptable. Concerning the second, it is
useful to remember that doctrine does not have, for us, the
character of a formal source of law, which is the same as
saying that the principles formulated by the scholars can-




not, by themselves, serve as the basis of a judgment when
the particular case has not been foreseen [by statute]. We
agree with the last portions, because both the judge and the
legislator must be inspired by the same principles, the
judge in order to fill in the gaps, and the legislator in order
to formulate the statute; and because the principles
adopted by the judges in order to supplement the deficien-
cies of legislation should harmonize with legislative pre-
cepts.
197. The Role that Equity Plays in Mexican
Law
Article 14 of the Constitution, in its last paragraph,
says that "in proceedings in the civil order, the final judg-
ment shall conform to the letter or the juridical interpreta-
tion of the statute, and in the absence of that, shall be
based on general principles of law." If one accepts that eq-
uity is a general principle, the most general of the princi-
ples of law, one would have to admit that it performs for us
a supplemental role, and that, in those cases in which there
is no statute applicable to the particular situation, and the
judge has exhausted the resources of juridical interpreta-
tion hereinabove discussed, he may and should be inspired,
in entering judgment, by principles of equity.
The only restriction that in our opinion should be indi-
cated is the one indicated very effectively by Professor Del
Vecchio, when he speaks of general principles:
If, then, one sees, the legislator has established only one
requisite with respect to the relationship that must ex-
ist between the general principles and the particular
norms of law: that between the one and the other there
be no disharmony or incongruency. The possibility of
applying a general principle in contradiction of a par-
ticular principle is precluded a priori.4,
47. Citation omitted by author.
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Therefore, a judgment based on standards of equity may
never be in opposition to existing statutory provisions. For
the same reason, the judge is not authorized to correct, un-
der the pretext that its generality is a source of injustice in
a concrete situation, the norms of positive law.
In our country, equity is referred to expressly in article
17 of the Labor Law, cited [earlier] in this work, and article
31, part IV of the Federal Constitution, which says:
Art. 31.-The obligations of Mexicans are [inter alia] ...
IV. To contribute to public expenses of the Federation,
as well as of the State and the Municipality in which
they reside, in such proportional and equitable manner
as may be provided by statute.
But in our law there are other norms that tacitly make ref-
erence to equity, thus making equity a resource of which
the judge may avail himself when there is no applicable
statute and he has been unsuccessful in utilizing the proce-
dures of juridical interpretation. We shall cite... articles
18, 19, 20, and 1857 of the current Civil Code:
Art. 18. The silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the
statutes does not authorize the judges to decline to re-
solve a controversy.
Art. 19. Judicial controversies of a civil nature shall be
resolved according to the letter of the statute or its ju-
ridical interpretation. In the absence of a statute they
shall be resolved according to the general principles of
law.
Art. 20. When there is a conflict of rights, and there is
no statute expressly applicable, the controversy shall be
resolved in favor of the litigant who tries to avoid in-
jury, and not in favor of him who tries to enrich himself.
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If the conflict is between the same rights or rights of the
same kind, it shall be decided in such a way that the
judge maintains the greatest possible equality between
the parties.
Art. 1857. When it is absolutely impossible to resolve
doubts through the application of the rules established
in the preceding articles, if those doubts have to do with
the accidental circumstances of the contract, if the con-
tract was gratuitous, then the doubts shall be resolved
in favor of the slightest transfer of rights and interests;
if the contract was onerous, the doubt shall be resolved
in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests. If the
doubts have to do with the principal object of the con-
tract, such that one cannot come to know what was the
intention or the will of the contracting parties, the con-
tract shall be null.
The references to equity are perfectly clear in the two
last precepts. To say that a conflict of rights should be re-
solved by maintaining the greatest possible equality be-
tween the persons involved, and saying that a matter
should be resolved by observing the dictates of equity, is the
same thing.
With respect to equity, the Supreme Court of Justice of
the Nation has maintained the following thesis:
Insofar as there are statutory norms applicable to the
case, there is no reason to try to correct them by substi-
tuting a subjective criterion. Insofar as the written law
has not positively recognized the dictates of equity, they
do not constitute law, and judges would be committing a
grave error if they wished to modify the statute in def-
erence to equity or, to put it more accurately, what they
consider to be equity, since it would create the danger of
arbitrariness. Therefore, in our law, equity does not
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have the juridical force of a corrective of or supplement
481
to statutory norms.
We are in complete agreement with the Supreme Court
when it states that equity does not have in our law the ju-
ridical force of a corrective of statutory norms; we believe,
accordingly, that when there is a statute applicable to a
particular case, the judge is not authorized to correct it on
the pretext that its strict application would work an injus-
tice. But we do not accept [the Court's] other thesis, that is,
that in Mexican law equity has no supplemental force.
Even when one does not accept equity as the most general
of the principles of law, one must acknowledge that there
are many provisions which, expressly or tacitly, directly or
indirectly, make reference to equity, thereby making equity
a resource to which the judge may refer when there is no
applicable norm and the rules of juridical interpretation
have been unable to provide a solution.
48. Citation omitted by author.
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